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ABSTRACT
Sixty years ago, Samuelson’s “Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” 
expounded the classification of goods, and Bain’s “Economies of Scale, 
Concentration and the Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing 
Industries” expounded the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. To 
the present day, rivalry in- and excludability from consumption classify 
goods, and subadditivity and irreversibility in production classify market 
structure. Opportunity costs of production in the form of prospective 
sunk costs incentivise investment and production, and the sunk costs 
themselves induce subadditivities, specialization and convexity of the 
marginal rate of technical substitution. Opportunity costs in consumption 
are determined by the marginal costs of replacement. In light of the 
recent Nobel price award to Jean Tirole, we revisit some of the forgotten 
discussions and clarify some of the terminology under a more economic 
framework of opportunity costs.
Keywords:	 classification	of	goods	and	markets,	opportunity	costs,	prospective	sunk	
costs
JEL:	D47,	D52,	H41
1 Introduction
Sixty years ago, Samuelson’s (1954) formalisation of Musgrave’s (1939) theory 
gave a seminal distinction between public consumption goods and private 
consumption goods that never set a universal rule for public expenditures, 
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as initially intended. Table 1 shows the Samuelson’s (1954) subtractability in 
consumption criterion also known as rivalry in consumption, depletability, 
scarcity, or summarily: opportunity cost in consumption (Buchanan, 2008).
Table 1: The classification of goods according to the consumption subtraction 
criterion
The consumption of a good by one 
consumer leads to a subtraction of 
consumption of some other consumer
The consumption of a good by one 
consumer leads to no subtraction of 
consumption of any other consumer
Private consumption goods Collective consumption goods
Source: Samuelson (1954).
Musgrave (1959) added a second dimension: excludability. The importance 
of excludability and property rights was stressed by Coase (1960), Olson 
(1965), and Ostrom (2003) as the criteria merged into the standard textbook 
combination shown in table 2.
Table 2: Rivalry and excludability criteria
Excludability from consumption
Excludable Non Excludable
Subtractability 
from consumption
Subtractable Pure private goods Common goods
Non subtractable Club goods Pure public goods
Source: Ostrom (1996).
Buchanan (1965, 2008) analysed club goods, and Ostrom (1977, 1996, 2003) 
common goods and common pool resources. The excludability criterion is 
of institutional (legal and political) and technical (feasibility and efficiency) 
nature, so there is no unique and consistent economic representation. 
Samuelson’s goal of finding an overarching classification of goods that would 
legitimise governmental provision of public goods has not been achieved. So, 
the classification neither explains nor legitimises governmental role in the 
provision of goods: governments mostly provide private consumption goods, 
and collective consumption goods are mostly provided by the private market 
as they are more efficiently produced in a competitive market based system 
(Wisniewski, 2013). Even in the field of market structures, empirical research 
does not conform to the theory and market concentration allows no deduction 
about competitiveness (Demsetz, 1968). Following the groundwork by Bain 
(1954) and Demsetz (1968), Baumol’s et al. (1982) Theory of contestable 
markets and endogenous cost structures entered the textbooks as shown in 
table 3.
This approach to goods and market structure classification uses exclusively 
economic terms, and as we shall see, is fully commensurable with the previous 
classification of goods.
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Table 3: Market classification according to irreversibility and jointness in 
production
Irreversibilities in production (“sunk costs”)
Large “sunk costs” Negligible “sunk costs”
Cost subadditivities in 
production (“economies 
of scale / scope”)
Large Natural monopoly Disciplined monopoly
Negligible Market with imperfections Normal market
Source: Baumol et al. 1982.
2 Interdependence of Economics and Institutions
Formally, institutions are laws, rules, regulations, and other formal or 
informal social norms of behaviour (the substantive definition). Functionally, 
institutions create and structure incentives for desirable behaviour (North, 
1990). The rivalry and excludability criteria actually show the interdependence 
of economic realities about the scarcity of a resource and institutional 
possibilities of mitigating that scarcity by allowing for an allocation mechanism. 
The role of the economic institutional mechanism design is to provide for the 
most suitable allocation mechanism (Hurwicz, 1960, 1973; Hurwicz & Reiter, 
2006) being the one mechanism with the highest informational efficiency 
(Hayek, 1945) communicating the dispersed information about desires 
and resourcefulness of individuals in society. Institutional mechanisms give 
incentives for the production of goods, their allocation, and for the market 
structures to form just as Bain (1954) has supposed. Economic reality, i.e. 
scarcity determines market structure. Market structure determines the game-
theoretical conduct of players, and this determines their performance. An 
endogenously deductive process of causation is explained in detail as follows.
The connection between goods and markets is normally unclear, as the 
classification belongs to different subjects: public finance and industrial 
organisation as shown in table 4.
Table 4: Institutional and economic classification criteria
Property rights existence and market pricing 
possibility
Positive price, Px > 0 Zero price, Px = 0
Subtractability, rivalry, 
and depletability in 
consumption: marginal 
costs of replacement.
MCx > 0
Pure private goods 
MCx > 0, Px > 0
Common goods 
MCx > 0, Px = 0
MCx = 0
Club goods 
MCx = 0, Px > 0
Pure public goods 
MCx = Px = 0
Source: Author’s own representation.
The horizontal axis, the excludability criterion is a component of property 
rights. Property rights are themselves institutional public goods, as a well-
defined, enforceable, transferable and exclusive property rights system is a 
necessary state of the world for an effective market allocation to take place 
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(Demsetz, 1967, 2008, 2011). There are two basic types of organisation systems 
for the purpose of allocation decision-making: centralised systems based on 
top-down allocation rules (lotteries, majoritarian voting systems, common-
law evolutionary rules, committees, and dictatorships), and a decentralised 
market allocation system based on voluntary trade and cooperation including 
homesteading for piously non owned resources. Centralised allocation 
rules cannot achieve maximisation of welfare as allocation is imposed on 
individuals (Sen, 1977, p. 53), although there are many occasions where such 
decision-making rules are necessary, for example in case of disputes. But even 
a centralised economy needs property rights. The Tirole’s (2006) socialist 
enterprise model needs a capitalist manager with sunk-cost collateral to 
mitigate moral-hazard.
The Robbinsian (1932) “What? How? For whom?” is impossible without 
property rights even in the case of centrally planned economies, as property 
rights confer necessary information and incentives. Primarily, property rights 
make allocation by prices according to the principle of scarcity possible. A full 
set of well-defined, enforceable, transferable, and exclusive property rights 
is indispensable for the decentralised market allocation of goods. Unpriced 
goods without property rights or other forms of exclusion are available free 
of charge (Px = 0), and anybody can free ride on them. Users rush to convert 
the free resources into possession and ownership: a race that Hardin (1968) 
described as tragedy of the commons. As Ostrom (2003) has shown, the 
tragedy of the commons does not need to occur if users of the common 
resource are able to design and institutionalize a mechanism of control. 
Efficient and sustainable production needs a set of rules and incentives. For 
Demsetz (1967, 2011), property rights primarily guide incentives for greater 
internalisation of externalities. An externality is a property of competitive 
social relationships that remains external to the market economy because 
of its high cost of internalisation. For Demsetz (1967, 2011) therefore, 
externalities are economically efficient. The same holds for information 
asymmetries that are too costly to internalise. Any production may also 
be seen as a combination of institutionally permissible or unconstrained 
human action. What shall be constrained, is a question of ethics and what is 
efficient to constrain, is decided by transaction costs and technical feasibility. 
Unethical behaviour with lower costs than internalisation policies is efficient, 
and property rights drive transaction costs down to the point of efficient 
internalisation.
Accumulation of capital (in any form) is the single most important determinant 
of economic development. One particular aspect of capital is of particular 
interest: the sunk investment. An investment is sunk if it is specialized to the 
point that it has no substitution alternative, thus having no opportunity cost 
of production, and an endless value of risk or uncertainty in case of failure. 
Before being sunk, the potential investment has an opportunity cost of 
capital equal to the value of the real option of the investment and the level 
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of risk or uncertainty equal to the prospective sunk cost. Sunk costs thus 
create specialization, cost irreversibilities and cost subadditivities that are 
major barriers to entry according to Baumol et al. (1982) but also increase 
the risks as specialization comes at the price of decreasing substitutability 
of productive resources and decreasing opportunity costs of production. 
So, without effective property rights, there is no incentive for risk-taking, 
investment, specialization, and efficient production with cost subadditivities. 
Prospective sunk investments increase opportunity costs of production and 
real option values. Opportunity cost of production is a two sided coin: on 
one side there is a possibility of market protection of incumbents against 
potential entrants and on the other side, there is possibility of higher risk 
as investment is sunk. Present anti-trust policies seem to be concerned only 
with the former problem of market centralisation, and less with the latter 
problem of entrepreneurship and risk. So, the anti-trust policies have to weigh 
between following rules: the less supplementary the resources (the lower the 
opportunity costs of production), the more convex the production possibility 
frontier (to the origin), and higher the cost subadditivities, i.e. higher the 
economies of scale and scope, and higher the efficiency in production, but 
also, higher the sunk costs, i.e. the risks for the investor.
Thus, the characteristics of resources, production functions and goods, 
endogenously define the characteristics of markets that furthermore 
influence strategy and performance, as in a standard Harvard “Structure-
Conduct-Performance” model (Bain, 1954), and “Contestable Markets” theory 
(Baumol, 1982; Baumol et al., 1982). The opportunity costs of production 
reflect risk and reward possibilities. Types of goods do ultimately determine 
types of markets and there are two types of goods producing inefficient 
results: club goods and common goods.
3 	 Opportunity	Cost	Based	Classification	of	Goods
Alternative ends, tastes and preferences are subjective and exogenous to 
theoretical economic analysis. They are the opportunity costs of consumption. 
Opportunity cost is an important concept in economics as it expresses the 
basic relationship between scarcity and choice (Buchanan, 2008). Scarcity 
according to Cairncross (1944) and Samuelson (1954) has an exclusively 
social, demand oriented context in the sense of rivalry, or competition for 
resources. Demsetz’s (1964, p. 20) perspective on scarcity is the production 
side: the marginal cost of replacement. Table 5 shows the same four types of 
goods, this time presented according to their opportunity costs of production 
and opportunity costs in consumption.
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Table 5: Interdependence of economics and institutions
The institutional framework
Efficient Inefficient
Economic 
facts
Resource or 
good is scarce
Positive opportunity 
costs of production and 
positive opportunity costs 
in consumption. 
No opportunity costs of 
production and positive 
opportunity costs in 
consumption.
Resource or 
good is not 
scarce
Positive opportunity 
costs of production and 
no opportunity costs in 
consumption.
No opportunity costs 
of production and no 
opportunity costs in 
consumption.
Source: Author’s own representation.
The opportunity cost of production is the basic economic incentive of 
production and important decision-making factor in the allocation of 
resources. It incorporates risks and rewards of sunk costs in a single measure: 
the investment real option. It is the part of an investment that is irreversible, 
the highest possible amount to be lost, and simultaneously a barrier to entry 
for competitors, once the investment option is exercised, guaranteeing 
monopoly rents.
The opportunity cost in consumption determines the allocative efficiency 
of existing goods and gives the optimal pricing to clear the market. Club 
goods and common goods therefore show some allocation problems. Club 
goods are made artificially scarce by the institutions of the society. Common 
goods lack necessary institutions for efficient allocation. Samuelson’s (1954) 
collective consumption goods have zero marginal costs (MCx) of consumption 
for any good xn subscript n denoting possible consumption quantities Qn 
(n = 1, 2, 3, …, N ) for all potential consumption quantities across the entire 
production / consumption spectrum:
∀𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋;      𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ��𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1 � = 0;      𝑛𝑛 ∈ ℕ (1) 
The replacement cost function is boundless with respect to demanded 
quantity n:
∀𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋;      𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀(𝑥𝑥1) = 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀(𝑥𝑥1+𝑛𝑛);     |𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 | → ∞;      𝑛𝑛 ∈ ℕ (2) 
The production/consumption schedule is independent of the total production/
consumption quantity. In case of Samuelson’s (1954) collective consumption 
goods, the production function consists entirely of sunk costs: a constant. In 
this case, the cost function is extremely subadditive. The marginal cost of the 
production/consumption schedule does not decrease monotonically with the 
quantity: the costs are nil from the very first production unit.
The marginal production/consumption costs, for private consumption goods 
are instead positive:
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∀𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋;      𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ��𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1 � > 0;      𝑛𝑛 ∈ ℕ (3) 
It implies that the production/consumption function is bounded in respect to 
some final quantity of produced goods M:
∀𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋;      𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀(𝑥𝑥1) < 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀(𝑥𝑥1+𝑛𝑛);     |𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 | ≤ 𝑀𝑀;      𝑛𝑛 ∈ ℕ,𝑀𝑀 ∈ ℕ (4) 
As Baumol (1972) pointed out, the production possibility frontier when 
using a positive externality (or emitting a negative externality) may present a 
non-convex shape. The allocative efficiency depends on the cross-section of 
opportunity costs in consumption and prices, and is satisfied when Px = Cx. So, 
for private consumption goods Px = MCx > 0, and for collective consumption 
goods Px = MCx = 0. Table 6 depicts the previous statements more clearly.
Table 6: Opportunity costs in consumption and opportunity cost of 
production
Opportunity cost of production given by 
institutional incentive mechanisms
Pricing is possible Pricing is impossible
Opportunity 
costs in 
consumption 
given by the 
economic reality
Quantity dependent 
(bounded) functions
Pure private goods 
MC > 0, P > 0
Common goods 
MC > 0, P = 0
Quantity independent 
(unbounded) functions
Club goods 
MC = 0, P > 0
Pure public goods 
MC = P = 0
Source: Author’s own representation.
Sunk costs induce economies of scale, i.e. subadditive production cost functions 
(Weitzman, 1983). Zero marginal costs in consumption imply superadditive 
consumption functions: no subtraction from further consumption, i.e. no 
opportunity costs in consumption. It is the goal of the economic optimization 
problem to produce at least cost. Goods with no rivalry in consumption and 
without any costs of replacement are produced with zero marginal costs, 
i.e. without opportunity costs in consumption. Which is very often equalised 
with monopoly power (does anybody still remember the Microsoft lawsuit 
case?). To say that a firm is guilty of monopoly power because its average 
cost curve is falling is to say that it is guilty of being efficient. A successful 
market structure depends not so much on allocative (static) as on productive 
(dynamic) efficiency. In an allocatively efficient industry, companies equalise 
marginal cost and price. Companies with large sunk investments and no 
marginal costs of replacement cannot possibly charge zero price.
It is not the physical states of the world which one cannot influence that one 
shall be guilty of, but only his actions and coercions and/or abuses of power 
to coerce.
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There are some goods that are usually wrongly classified: cinemas and air 
flights are fine examples. They are wrongly put into the category of non-
rival goods, as, there is no opportunity cost of usage for the next customer 
as long as there are empty seats. This view disregards the non-monotonicity 
and boundaries of production functions. These instead are lumpy goods, 
meaning their production function is not monotone, and they are ultimately 
subtractable at the end of every supply unit that consists of many consumption 
units, subtractable in lumps. Normally, these goods are also composite of two 
or more other goods. For example cinemas. No two seats in a cinema are 
equal, and ultimately a composite service is sold: the movie projection, which 
is non rivalrous up to the last seat, but a single seat in the projection room is 
rivalrous (and with positive marginal costs in consumption). When at least one 
part of the composite service is subtractable, the entire composite service is 
subtractable, because adding a superadditive consumption function to a non-
superadditive consumption function yields a non-superadditive consumption 
function, i.e. a private consumption good. So, where is the big problem within 
the classification of goods? Let us think of an example. Angelina Jolie may 
make a movie only once, which is a sunk cost, but the movie may be viewed 
an unlimited number of times, in a quantitatively unbounded consumption 
function. So, the problem is the production scarcity of Angelina Jolie movies. 
But once they are produced, they are not rival or subtractable in consumption. 
Angelina Jolie is a natural monopolistic provider of Angelina Jolie movies. The 
question her fans are interested in is not how to punish her for the monopoly 
position, but how to incentivize her to produce more movies. This is also the 
main point of Demsetz (1964, 1966, 1967, 1968, 2008, 2011), that has been 
missed by the market regulators in the past.
The most common definition of monopoly translates into a market structure 
with just one supplier. This is a neo-classic substantive definition. A functional 
definition is concentrated on monopoly power: a market structure with 
the producer having market power to control either prices or quantities. 
According to Baumol (1982) a monopoly is an uncontestable market position. 
It is a functional definition that includes not only what is seen, but tries also 
to include what is not seen: the possibility to contest the market power of the 
incumbent producer. So, even if the monopolist has market power to control 
prices or quantities, he won’t abuse his power if his position can be contested 
by a sudden entrant, which could be detrimental for his profits.
4 Opportunity	Cost	Based	Classification	of	Markets
Table 3 (Market classification according to the irreversibility and jointness 
in production criteria) has according to Weitzman (1983) a serious flaw. 
Weitzman postulated that in a timeless production function and without sunk 
costs no fixed costs are possible and subsequently no cost subadditivities may 
exist. Table 7 shows the implications of the critique.
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Table 7: Market structure according to jointness and irreversibility in 
production
Irreversibility in production 
(“sunk costs”)
Large 
“sunk costs”
Neglectable 
“sunk costs”
Jointness in 
production 
(“Economies of scale 
/ scope”)
Large 
FC > 0,  AC’ < 0,  MC < AC Natural monopoly IMPOSSIBLE!
Negligible 
FC = 0,  AC’ ≥ 0,  MC ≈ AC IMPOSSIBLE! Normal market
Source: Authors’ own representation.
The Weitzman (1983) critique implies two impossible results shown in the table 
7. The subadditivity in production implies sinking average costs and positive 
sunk costs. According to this view, only two opposite market structures are 
possible: normal market and natural monopoly. Natural monopoly is a direct 
consequence of the sunk cost. But the sunk cost is a double sided coin: it is 
simultaneously a source of opportunity and a source of risk. This has significant 
implications for the anti-trust policies as they take into account only the 
opportunities but not the risks. Table 8 draws on that conclusion and shows a 
modified representation with prospective sunk costs as a maximum value at 
risk for an investment and representing the opportunity costs of production, 
and the marginal cost of replacement representing the opportunity cost in 
consumption.
Table 8: Opportunity costs of production and opportunity costs in 
consumption
Opportunity costs of production
Positive prospective 
sunk costs = positive 
real option values 
No prospective sunk 
costs = non positive 
option values
Opportunity costs 
in consumption
Positive MC in 
consumption
Private and lumpy goods 
MCx ≈ Px ; Px > 0; PSC > 0
Common goods 
MCx > Px ; Px = 0; PSC = 0
No MC in 
consumption
Monopoly goods 
MCx = 0; Px > 0; PSC > 0
Non economic goods 
MCx = Px = PSC = 0
Source: Authors’ own representation.
Any categorisation of goods has to start from the basic economic question 
of scarcity, i.e. the opportunity costs in consumption and the effects of 
institutions on allocating the consumption of these scarce resources. Any 
consumption of products that are not readily found in nature, however circular 
an economy may be, needs incentives for their production. Rival goods are 
ultimately finite in consumption. Rival goods are economic goods. Scarcity is 
a temporary local shortage of a good. The scarce good has to be produced. 
Without the right incentives, there is low probability of its spontaneous 
and efficient production. Government production is no guarantee of 
efficient production as government officials cannot know even what goods 
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should be produced. And even if they could by some miracle have that 
information, the government has no inherent incentives to produce the good 
efficiently. So, we mostly count on a well-defined system of property rights 
to produce the needed incentives for dynamic efficiency. Private property 
rights are institutions that induce the development of intellectual and other 
property rights, saving, production, commerce and consumption. In a capitalist 
society, the pure public good has the substantive form of an idea, work of 
literature, music, art, etc. A form of intellectual property, recognized by the 
patent and copyright laws, firstly comes to life as an intermediary form of a 
club good. The necessary research and development costs are sunk in form of 
money, time, and effort as the real option of investment is exercised. Once 
successfully produced, its marginal cost of production is negligible, enabling 
the producer to earn monopoly profits. It may be argued that a government 
subsidy amounting to the cost of research and development may provide a 
more efficient solution, but then the question of who decides what goods 
are to be invented, researched and developed, stays largely unanswered. 
To achieve dynamic efficiency, one must sacrifice static efficiency. So, club 
goods are dynamically efficient but statically inefficient. To achieve both, 
one needs to have an optimal duration of copyrights and patents to provide 
for production incentives without excessive monopolistic profits for the 
producers. Various goods have different costs of research and development 
but not necessarily different patent expiration durations which leaves the 
market with many institutionally supplied monopolies. When the patent 
ultimately does expire, the good becomes a generic, public domain, pure 
public good.
The problem of the tragedy of the commons arises with common goods and 
common pool resources when the non-renewable and ultimately depletable 
(scarce) resource is depleted at a rate higher than its rate of renewal. The 
opportunity cost between present and future consumption of a non-
renewable common pool resource is the interest rate (the time preference 
rate). The rate of depletion of a common pool resource is equal to this rate. The 
difference between the rate of depletion and the rate of renewal can be seen 
as the goods’ true marginal cost. In the case of common goods, the price is nil 
or under the marginal cost. To assure for dynamic efficiency, the good should 
be priced according to its marginal cost. Normally, this goes via privatisation. 
There are many nuances of property rights, and according to Ostrom et al. 
(1996), there is mostly no need to fully privatize a good to achieve desired 
efficiencies. Without some institutional mechanism of allocation, explicit or 
implicit pricing is impossible, and the depletion of common goods is almost 
guaranteed. The most effective allocation mechanism is the price. Price is 
simultaneously information and incentive (Hayek, 1945; Demsetz, 1964, 
2011). A system of prices in a market economy fulfils several roles at once: 
allocation between consumption and production, and gives information on 
risks, marginal costs and marginal benefits.
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Table 9: Possibility and desirability of pricing
Opportunity costs of production (dynamic allocation)
Positive Non existent
Opportunity 
costs in 
consumption 
(static allocation)
Scarce 
goods
Pricing feasible and 
desirable for dynamic and 
static purposes.
Pricing not feasible but 
desirable. Through the 
process of “propriation” 
some aspects of it may be 
privatized.
Non-
scarce 
goods
Pricing feasible and 
desirable to repay for the 
“sunk costs”. In the long 
run, the good becomes a 
public good.
Pricing neither feasible nor 
desirable. Goods neither 
locally nor temporarily 
scarce, depletable nor 
subtractable.
Source: Author’s own representation.
5 Conclusion
There aren’t enough resources around, regardless of production efforts. As 
long as there are desires, and incentives to produce, the impact of scarcity 
on human lives is less dramatic. Scarcity is the main topic of economics. The 
goods are either scarce in production (there is a shortage thereof) or they are 
scarce in consumption (they are rival, depletable, subtractable).
To make the common goods dynamically more efficient we need an effective 
system of property rights that will cover this grey area. To make the club goods 
statically more efficient, we need to terminate their exclusive property rights 
just in time to still induce further investment, research, and development 
without causing static inefficiencies.
By examining their substantive characteristics, all goods fall into one of the 
four categories. The presented classification has several benefits: it avoids the 
accounting terms of fixed and variable costs that are prone to misclassification, 
it uses simple economic terminology, and it can easily be formally stated 
and graphically represented by using marginal rates of transformation in 
production possibility frontiers. The terms scarcity in production and scarcity 
in consumption fit perfectly the concept of analysis based on opportunity 
costs of production and opportunity costs in consumption.
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POVZETEK
	 1.02	Pregledni	znanstveni	članek
Klasifikacija oportunitetnih stroškov, 
dobrin in trgov1
Ključne	besede:	 klasifikacija	 dobrin	 in	 trgov,	 oportunitetni	 stroški,	 potencialni	
nepovratni	stroški
V luči nedavne Nobelove nagrade Jeanu Tiroleu so se avtorji članka odločili 
ponovno preučiti dve pomembni teoriji iz leta 1954 o klasifikaciji dobrin in 
trgov (ki sta osnova vsem univerzitetnim ekonomskim študijam) in tudi o 
vladnem zagotavljanju javnih dobrin, o vladnih protimonopolnih politikah in o 
politikah tržne koncentracije.
Teoriji sta Samuelsonova teorija (1954) o klasifikaciji dobrin v dobrine 
zasebne in skupne potrošnje ter Bainova teorija (1954) o endogenih tržnih 
strukturah. Obe teoriji se poučujeta ločeno tako v makroekonomiji, kot tudi 
v mikroekonomiji, čeprav imata enako teoretično ozadje, ki se ga pogosto 
zanemarja.
Dobrine se klasificirajo po merilih tekmovalnosti in izključenost iz potrošnje, 
tržne strukture pa po subaditivnosti in ireverzibilnosti v proizvodnji, to je 
po oportunitetnih stroških proizvodnje in oportunitetnih stroški v potrošnji. 
Oportunitetni stroški proizvodnje v obliki potencialnih nepovratnih stroškov 
spodbujajo investicije in proizvodnjo. Potencialni nepovratni stroški imajo 
vlogo neizkoriščene realne možnosti za investicije. Če se ta možnost 
izkoristi, postanejo potencialni nepovratni stroški nepovratni, sprožijo 
uvajanje subaditivnosti, specializacijo in konveksnost mejne stopnje tehnične 
substitucije. To je osnova Baumolove (1982) sporne tržne teorije, ki temelji 
na Bainovi (1954) teoriji endogenih tržnih struktur in kasnejše harvardske 
paradigme struktura-ravnanje-učinkovitost (SCP).
Paradigma SCP je osnova sodobne teorije o industrijski organizaciji in vladnih 
protimonopolnih politikah ter politikah tržne koncentracije. Z uporabo 
Demsetzovih (1968) argumentov se oportunitetni stroški v potrošnji določajo 
z mejnimi stroški substitucije in se končajo z argumentom, da so za njihovo 
dobavo, namesto vladne proizvodnje, potrebne institucije in mehanizmi za 
spodbujanje proizvodnje. Pred šestdesetimi leti se je razprava končala brez 
odkritja vseobsegajoče klasifikacije dobrin, ki bi upravičila vladno zagotavljanje 
javnih dobrin, medtem ko sedanje protimonopolne politike in politike o 
koncentraciji še vedno niso usklajene.
1 Predstavljeno delo je podprla Univerza v Reki v okviru projektov številka 13.02.1.3.11 in 
13.02.1.2.09.
134 International Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 1/2015
Davor Mance, Nenad Vretenar, Jana Katunar
Klasifikacija Samuelson-Musgrave-Buchanan-Ostrom ne razloži niti ne 
upravičuje vladne vloge pri zagotavljanju dobrin. Vlada večinoma zagotavlja 
zasebno potrošnjo dobrin, saj so dobrine, ki jih dobavlja, bodisi pokvarljive 
oziroma minljive ali konkurenčne v potrošnji. Skupno potrošnjo dobrin 
večinoma zagotavlja zasebni trg, saj so bolj učinkovito proizvedene v sistemu, 
ki temelji na konkurenčnem trgu z močnimi spodbudami za proizvodnjo - v 
okolju subaditivnosti stroškov in superaditivnosti dobička. Na področju 
tržnih struktur, empirična raziskava ne ustreza teoriji in tržna koncentracija 
ne omogoča sklepanja o konkurenčnosti. Članek v devetih razpredelnicah 
predlaga novo klasifikacijo, ki močno črpa iz omenjenih teorij, jih pojasnjuje 
in dopušča uvedbo institucionalne/ekonomske dihotomije. Predstavljena 
klasifikacija ima več prednosti: izogiba se računovodskim izrazom o fiksnih in 
variabilnih stroških, ki se jih pogosto napačno razvršča, uporablja enostavno 
ekonomsko terminologijo, mogoče jo je enostavno formalno navajati in 
z mejnimi ravnmi transformacije v proizvodnji možnih meja tudi grafično 
predstavljati.
